



Five Plans for Five Possibilities Part 8

Plan One: The Delivered Bomb

57 Most organisations receive huge amounts of mail, whether through the Post Office or other delivery and courier firms. This is an attractive route into your building or into your hands. It is a targeted attack. The aim is to kill or maim or disrupt, not to cause structural damage or mass casualties. The nature of your business and the current focus of terrorism or “activism” will give you, in consultation with the local police, a reasonable picture of how likely this form of attack is, and this will dictate just how far you want to go in your planning.

Preparing for the Possibility

58 Planning for the delivery of an explosive or incendiary device is based on two simple features:

- it will already have undergone some fairly rough handling, by the Post Office or by its courier.
- uncertainty over exact delivery times, and the weight and complexity of reliable timing devices, makes it very unlikely that the device will be triggered by a timer.

Handling delivered mail is therefore not generally dangerous in itself.

Recognising a Suspicious Item

59 The police Crime Prevention Department can give guidance on the features that may identify the typical letter or parcel bomb. And staff who handle mail can be helped to pick out potentially “suspicious” items by building good housekeeping measures into usual business routines:

- let staff know what is the usual pattern of deliveries and the types of item, and forewarn when unusual deliveries are expected; and
- encourage good practice in those you deal with regularly by having a clearly identifiable sender shown on each item.

Make sure that you have identified and briefed all staff who handle delivered items (think of Reception as well as the Mail Room).

60 If the risk and scale of the problem for you is sufficiently great you may want to invest in

commercially available X-ray or other equipment. The Crime Prevention Department can advise. This equipment is only as good as its operators and you will need a regular programme of training and checking to see that procedures are being followed.

Dealing with the Event

61 If you have detected a suspicious item:

- leave it alone (do not play with it to investigate it further, do not put it in a bucket of water or put something on top of it or throw it out of the window....);
- clear and secure the immediate area making sure the police will still have unhindered access to the suspicious item; and
- call the police.

Plan Two: Incendiary Devices

62 Incendiary devices are traditionally the weapon of choice against the retail sector, and occasionally against certain industries or public buildings. They may form part of a targeted attack (because of who the company is or what it sells) or the placing may be relatively random (if the aim is to damage a town centre or shopping mall itself). The purpose is to cause economic damage (directly and via publicity), not casualties.

Preparing for the Possibility

63 Planning against the possibility that an incendiary attack will be mounted against you is based on some basic assumptions:

- the device will be concealed for ignition when the premises are empty;
- as damage is the objective, having more than one potential seat of fire is attractive to the attackers;
- anything that triggers a sprinkler system will, because of the damage ensuing, be a good result even if total destruction is not achieved; and
- incendiary devices do not explode, they ignite.



Minimising the Risk of Successful Attack

64 Generally speaking the business need for continued mass public access will preclude any major screening programmes to search for devices being brought in, except at periods of the highest alert. The contingency plan should provide for:

- a search at the end of each day's business;
- a continued search after the discovery of one item; and
- plans for a discreet search during business hours in a time of high risk.

65 Devices will be carefully but not elaborately concealed, and the staff searching will not therefore need a high degree of knowledge to carry out rapid but thorough searching of easily accessible hiding places. All staff can maintain vigilance for those acting oddly in their areas.

Dealing with the Event

66 If an incendiary device has been discovered during search or by chance:

- do not touch it;
- clear and secure the immediate area; and
- call the police.

67 If there is a fire, and there is reason to suspect this is as a result of an incendiary device rather than a common accident, it may be acceptable to make an immediate, and brief, attempt to extinguish the fire if your existing fire arrangements and staff training provide for this. Even if staff have been trained, the possibility of multiple attack by incendiaries should be remembered, and staff and visitors evacuated according to pre-arranged fire plans.

Plan Three: The Bomb on the Premises

68 In practice it is unusual in the UK for a bomb containing high explosive (rather than an item delivered through the post or an incendiary) to be found inside a building, although it is not unknown. It is important to plan for this eventuality, not least because both terrorists and pranksters frequently claim that there is a bomb in the building. A bomb, with its explosive, timing and arming devices and its concealment, represents a considerable investment of planning, determination and skill. Left within a building, or in some other public space, it represents a very serious attempt at damage and disruption – and a disregard for the possibility of the loss of life. The threat call itself can cause economic disruption.

Preparing for the Possibility

69 Planning for a bomb attack inside your office, public areas, car park, storage unit or yard perimeter is based on certain assumptions:

- the bomber has to make his or her way inside your perimeter and leave the device in such a way to – at minimum – secure his or her getaway (suicide attacks have not been part of UK experience);
- an attack, whether with high explosive or home-made explosive, is always life threatening; and
- there will always be some structural damage, if only broken windows.



Minimising the Risk of Successful Attack

70 An office block or a factory with access control for staff and visitors (and their cars) offers relatively little opportunity for this sort of attack – providing the systems in place are properly applied. A public place, such as a shop or airport, is more at risk and at times of high alert search of baggage may be the only available means of protection – and deterrent. The risk of successful attack – and, equally importantly, the disruption caused by persistent threat calls – can be minimised by:

- search procedures by staff of their own areas; and
- search procedures for public areas.

71 Good housekeeping practice comes into its own against this sort of attack. Public and private areas should be kept as clear as possible, with rubbish regularly removed and boxes and equipment stored tidily and in their own recognised places. Regular users, as well as cleaning, maintenance and security staff, should all be encouraged to know what is usually where so that they can spot the unusual.

72 It is frequently said that any package that is out of place is a suspicious package – but you will not want to disrupt your business by making your staff anxious about every carelessly dumped bin bag. Their attitude to keeping their patch free of clutter will make them feel safer, deter a potential attacker – and make searching much simpler if a threat is made against you.

Dealing with the Event

73 The internal bomb attack is most often experienced as a terrorist hoax or a prank. However the potential damage, injury and loss of life could be severe. So the contingency plan in this case must cover both the handling of a threat call and the discovery of a suspicious item, and should involve:

- immediate notification to the police of any threat;
- pre-set plans for reacting to the threat call;
- pre-set, easily displayed and practised plans for evacuating to a place of safety (Part 9);

- pre-set and practised means of communicating evacuation plans to visitors; and
- means for securing the site against entry until the police have allowed access again.

Plan Four: Bombs outside the Building

74 The vehicle bomb represents an extreme form of terrorist attack, designed to cause maximum economic damage, both short and long term. The risk of large numbers of casualties and deaths is great because of the large scale structural damage that invariably results. Generally, in the UK, vehicle-borne bombs consist of home-made explosive in large quantity, involving a high degree of pre-planning, commitment and expertise. They are frequently accompanied by threat calls and once again it is important to be able to deal with the disruption caused by terrorist hoaxes or pranksters as well as with the incident itself.

75 There is also the chance that bombs will be left in streets, parks and other public places and in bags, briefcases and parcels. The potential for loss of life, injury and disruption is still high although the long term damage may not be so extensive.

Preparing for the Possibility

76 Plans for dealing with the chance of injury to your staff or damage to your property from a device outside your building have to be based on one key issue:

- Evacuation always carries a certain risk, either of staff moving closer to, rather than away from, the bomb (since warnings are rarely explicit) or of moving into the open where they may be at risk more from falling masonry and flying glass than the blast itself.

77 On this basis, occupiers of buildings should establish whether “internal evacuation” to a bomb shelter within the building is a viable option. In a bomb shelter area staff can be assured that whatever structural damage occurs to their building or those surrounding it, they will be safer until the emergency services can give them the all clear to leave. For further advice refer to Part 9, paragraph 91.



Dealing with the Event

78 Plans should cover the following:

- immediate notification to the police of any threat;
- pre-set plans for reacting to the threat call; and
- pre-set, easily displayed and practised plans for evacuating to a place of safety (which may be either a bomb shelter area or an external site) (Part 9).

Plan Five: Telephoned Bomb Threats

79 The phenomenon of telephoned bomb threats has become a commonplace, so much so that they merit a separate section earlier in this booklet.

Planning for the Possibility

80 Plans need to cover two possibilities:

- receipt of a call that refers to your own building; and
- receipt of a call about a bomb elsewhere.

81 All staff likely to answer your published numbers, in working hours or overnight, should be familiar with the Bomb Threat aide-mémoire and pro forma (Appendix 1), and have a supply ready to hand. They need to be fully familiar with any recording facilities or last number redial or display facilities that your switchboard provides. They must know how to contact both the security co-ordinator and the police.

82 A member of staff who has taken a call must be available to talk to the police.

Dealing with the Event

83 The pro forma will assist staff to handle the call itself and to record the necessary detail. If the call is threatening an attack elsewhere, your action will end once you have informed the police and handed over to them any necessary paperwork. But the threat may be to your premises, and will involve on your part:

- preliminary assessment of the threat (take it seriously.... or not?) If it is a giggling child, you may assume it is a hoax and adopt the “do nothing” approach. But if there is the slightest doubt you should consider ...
- initiating your evacuation (Part 9) or search (Part 10) plans, in whatever combination the timescale quoted by the caller and the location quoted by the caller suggests.

Remember, whatever you decide, always report any call to the police. **Click here to go to Plan Six:**



84 The purpose of evacuation is to move people from an area where they might be at risk to a place of lesser risk. The biggest dilemma facing anyone who has responsibility for an evacuation decision in the context of a terrorist threat is how to judge where might constitute a place of safety. If, for example, an evacuation route would take staff past a suspicious device outside your building, evacuation may be the riskiest course to take.

85 The decision to evacuate will normally be taken by the company, but the police will advise. In exceptional cases the police may insist on evacuation, but they will always need the help of the company's security co-ordinator; in other cases, such as the large vehicle bomb outside the premises and the possibility of secondary devices, they may insist that people do not leave the building.

86 Evacuation may need to take place in response to:

- a threat call directly to the building;
- a threat call received elsewhere and notified to you by the police;
- discovery of a suspicious package in the building (perhaps a letter bomb or incendiary, or a larger hold-all device);
- discovery by you of a suspicious item or vehicle outside your building; or
- discovery of an external device notified to you by the police.

Whatever the circumstances you must advise the police of what action you are taking.

The Evacuation Plan

87 In order to react sensibly, you must have evacuation plans ready. Depending on the circumstances of your building – its size, the number of exits, the amount of public access – your evacuation plan may involve:

- full evacuation outside the building; or

- evacuation of part of the building if the device is small and thought to be a one-off confined to one location (eg a letter bomb in a post room or a small incendiary type device); or
- evacuation of all staff apart from designated searchers; or
- full evacuation to an internal safe area – a Bomb Shelter Area.

88 If a time has been given for an explosion on the premises, you must allow sufficient time for the evacuation.

Essential Components of an Evacuation Plan

89 All plans must cover:

- designated routes and exits;
- a means of communicating effectively with staff, who may need directing away from one route if it is likely to take them into danger;
- designated staff to act as marshals during the evacuation, especially if there are likely to be large numbers of the public in the building, and/or as contact points once the assembly area is reached;
- an assembly area or areas at least 500m from the buildings (car parks should not be used), and an alternate area or areas. This distance will put staff beyond police cordons for most vehicle-borne devices. However, for absolute safety an alternative assembly area or areas at least 1km away may have to be considered; and
- training for staff with particular responsibilities, and practices for all staff.

All plans should be discussed in advance with the police, the emergency services, the local authority and neighbours.



Bomb Shelter Areas

90 As many of the injuries from bomb attack, especially large city centre lorry bombs, come from flying glass and other fragments, internal evacuation can be a good way of avoiding death or injury to staff.

91 Some buildings may offer suitable bomb shelter areas. These must always be selected with the advice of a qualified structural engineer; their size must be suitable; they must conform to fire regulations; and there must be a means of communicating with staff while within the shelter, even while there is a temporary loss of power, as may happen after a major explosion. Addresses for further sources of advice can be found at the end of this booklet, or contact your local Police Crime Prevention Department.

Re-occupancy

92 Re-occupancy must always be discussed with the police and as necessary the other emergency services. Safety remains paramount, and allowance must be made for secondary devices, vagueness of descriptions of location and misleading times. Structures may be unsound and damage to power and gas may make the environment unsafe. If an explosion has taken place, the building will be a crime scene.

93 Searches may be used as a part of routine good house-keeping, for example in shops, especially at close of business, when there is a general alert about incendiary or other types of attacks against the retail sector or some segments of it. Or a search may need to be carried out in response to a specific threat.

What to Look For

94 Bombs and incendiary devices are disguised in many ways. Searchers do not have to be expert in explosive devices. They are looking for anything:

- that should not be there;
- that cannot be accounted for; and
- that is out of place.

Who Should Search?

95 The main qualification for a searcher is familiarity with the place he or she is searching.

The police will not normally search premises following receipt of a bomb threat. They are not familiar with the premises and layout, and will not be aware of what should be there and what is out of place. They cannot therefore search as quickly and as thoroughly as staff who work there all the time.

Search Plans

96 Search plans should be prepared in advance and staff trained in them. The objective is to make sure that the whole building is checked as quickly and effectively as possible. If you do not search you will have no means of knowing when or whether your building is safe for re-occupancy, and if you do not have a plan your searching will be slow, costly and worrying for all those concerned.

Search Priorities

97 Those areas which will be used as bomb shelters or evacuation assembly areas, together with those areas where the greater number of the public or staff are likely to be vulnerable should be searched first. Public areas to which the terrorist may have had easy access should also have priority. Do not overlook car parks, the outside area and the perimeter.

Search Sectors

98 The first step in preparing a search plan is to divide the building into sectors. If the business is organised into departments, sections and so on it will be convenient for these to be search sectors. Each sector must be of manageable size for one or two searchers. Effective and systematic searching takes time.

99 Depending on room sizes, the sector may be one large room – such as a factory floor, shop, department or perhaps a number of small offices in an office suite. Cloakrooms, stairs, corridors and lifts must be included in the search plans. Do not forget to include car parks and other areas outside the building.

Initiating a Search

100 How is a search initiated? There are options:

- sending a message to the search teams over a public address system. It should be coded to avoid unnecessary disruption and alarm;
- use of personal radios/pagers; or
- a telephone 'cascade' system: the Section Supervisor rings, say, three members, who in turn each ring a further three members and so on until all the teams have been alerted.



How to Search

101 The conduct of searches will depend on local circumstances and local knowledge. The overriding principle is that they should be conducted in a systematic and thorough manner so that no part is left unchecked. The searchers need to practice, to get a feel for the logical progression through their area (whether it be in a department store, office, cinema, warehouse, depot, supermarket or restaurant) and the length of time it will take.

What Happens when Something is Found?

102 The searcher who finds a suspicious item must not move it or interfere with it in any way. He or she will need a pre-planned method of communicating what has been found to the search co-ordinator. Action thereafter will depend on the nature of the device and the location. The golden rules are:

- do not touch it or move it;
- move away from the device immediately;
- communicate what has been found to the co-ordinator, using hand-held radios only once out of the immediate vicinity of the device; and
- the person finding the device must remain on hand to brief the police on the exact location and description.
- more detailed advice can be obtained from your local Police Crime Prevention Department.



Role of the Police Part 11

103 As will have been clear from the earlier sections, the Crime Prevention Department (either directly or through access to other police colleagues) of your local police force can assist with:

- assessing the threat, both generally and specifically;
- advice on physical security equipment and its particular application to the methods used by terrorists; they will be able to comment on its effectiveness as a deterrent, as protection and as an aid to investigation post-incident;
- advice on local installers of equipment; and
- devising plans and ensuring their conformity with other local arrangements, the requirements of the police service itself and those of the other emergency services.

104 For reasons of practicality the police cannot undertake search of your premises on your behalf, but they can offer advice on search plans.

It is essential that all the work you undertake on protective security is done in partnership with the police, and your neighbours, if your community is to be secure. As well as safeguarding your own business, the steps you take can make an important contribution to detecting terrorists.

105 Further guidance on the role of the police, the other emergency services and the local authority can be found in the companion booklet *Business As Usual*.



Part 12 Recovery Plans

106 Planning for recovery from disaster is increasingly being recognised as an essential component in the management of business. Businesses are used to planning against commercial risks – the sudden failure of a critical supplier; an unexpected bad debt; industrial action or the discovery of a serious fault in a product or process. Techniques of risk management have been developed to mitigate the consequences for the firm.

107 The companion booklet *Business As Usual* has been specifically written to help businesses prepare for recovery from the worst type of terrorist attack: the large vehicle-borne device in a city centre. It is designed to help any manager re-establish his or her business, focusing on the need to plan for the recovery of four essential components – people, premises, product and purchasers.



Useful Addresses Part 13

These organisations produce guidance notes relating to their fields of interest:

The British Council for Offices

Shinfield Grange
Cutbush Lane
Shinfield
Reading
Berkshire RG2 9AF
Tel: 0118 988 5505

The British Council of Shopping Centres

1 Queen Anne's Gate
London SW1H 9BT
Tel: 0171 222 1122

Health and Safety Executive

For information on the health and safety considerations relating to protective security measures. (For your local office, see under HSE in the telephone directory).

National Terrorist Crime Prevention Unit

PO Box 849
London SW1P 1XD
Tel: 0171 931 7142

For advice on buildings, contact:

Glass and Glazing Federation

44–48 Borough High Street
London SE1 1XB
Tel: 0171 403 7177

Institution of Civil Engineers

Library and Information Services
1–7 Great George Street
London SW1P 3AA
Tel: 0171 222 7722

Institution of Structural Engineers

11 Upper Belgrave Street
London SW1X 8BH
Tel: 0171 235 4535

Laminated Glass Information Centre

299 Oxford Street
London W1R 1LA
Tel : 0171 499 1720



Appendix 1

Actions to be Taken on Receipt of a Bomb Threat

- SWITCH ON TAPE RECORDER (IF CONNECTED)
- TELL THE CALLER WHICH TOWN/DISTRICT YOU ARE ANSWERING FROM
- RECORD THE EXACT WORDING OF THE THREAT

.....

.....

.....

.....

- ASK THESE QUESTIONS

- 1 Where is the bomb right now?
- 2 When is it going to explode?
- 3 What does it look like?
- 4 What kind of bomb is it?
- 5 What will cause it to explode?
- 6 Did you place the bomb?
- 7 Why?
- 8 What is your name?
- 9 What is your address?
- 10 What is your telephone number?

- RECORD TIME CALL COMPLETED

.....

- WHERE AUTOMATIC NUMBER REVEAL EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE RECORD NUMBER SHOWN

.....

- INFORM THE CO-ORDINATOR

Name and telephone number of person informed

.....

- CONTACT THE POLICE BY USING THE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBER

Time informed



THIS PART SHOULD BE COMPLETED ONCE THE CALLER HAS HUNG UP AND POLICE/BUILDING SECURITY OFFICER HAVE BEEN INFORMED

Time and date of call.....

Length of call.....

Number at which call is received (that is, your extension number)

ABOUT THE CALLER

Sex of caller? Male Female Nationality?..... Age.....

THREAT LANGUAGE

Well spoken Irrational Taped Foul Incoherent Message read by threatmaker

CALLER'S VOICE

Calm Crying Clearing throat Angry Nasal Slurred
Excited Stutter Disguised Slow Lisp Accent *
Rapid Deep Familiar Laughter Hoarse

If the voice sounded familiar, whose did it sound like?

.....

* What accent

BACKGROUND SOUNDS

Street noises House noises Animal noises Crockery Motor
Clear Voice Static PA system Booth
Music Factory machinery Office machinery

Other (specify)

REMARKS

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Signature Date

Print name.....

This appendix may be freely photocopied

Appendix 2 Protection against Flying Glass

1 There are three main methods of protection against flying glass:

- 1 Applying transparent polyester anti-shatter film to the glass and providing bomb blast net curtains
- 2 Installing blast resistant glass i.e. laminated glass
- 3 Installing blast resistant secondary glazing inside exterior glazing.

2 The following details are designed to assist in the specification of protection and give pointers about installation.

Anti-shatter Film

3 Polyester film at least 175 microns thick should be used; 300 micron film should be considered for panes over 10 square metres or for ground floor windows over 3 square metres.

4 The specification can be lowered to at least 100 microns if bomb blast net curtains are also to be used.

5 The film must only be fixed under clean and dust-free conditions. On new windows or areas being re-glazed, it is preferable for the film to be applied to the glass to its extreme edges, before fixing the frames. But if extensive building work is continuing after installation, dust and debris may cause unacceptable scratching and it may be better to postpone fixing the film until after work is completed. The film should be applied as close as possible to the putty of glazing bars with an edge gap of less than 3mm. Five mm can be tolerated along particular irregular putty edges.

6 Butt joints are acceptable if film is insufficiently wide to cover the glass in one piece.

7 Film cannot be applied to the patterned side of frosted, figured or reeded glass.

8 On double glazing, if the window consists of two separate frames and in normal use the inner frame can be opened independently of the other, both panes should be treated. If the inner pane cannot be opened independently, or a "sealed unit" if fitted, applying film to the inner pane is sufficient. (Sometimes inner frames are only lightly fitted; if so, they should be fully secured).

Bomb Blast Net Curtains

9 Such curtains are only for use in combination with anti-shatter film. If the film is of sufficient thickness they may not be needed, but they are vital with single glazed windows in small panes in Georgian frames.

10 The curtains should be of 90 or 100 denier polyester terylene curtain material and be made twice the width and 1.5 times the length of the window. The bottom hem must incorporate flexible weights at the rate of 400 grammes per metre. The excess length should be folded concertina-wise and placed in shallow troughs at window sill level.

11 Curtains should normally be installed 50 to 100mm from the glass, but can be further back if other overriding conditions dictate.

Blast Resistant Glass: Toughened Glass

12 Toughened glass provides for safety but not security and is therefore not recommended for external window or door use.

13 Toughened (fully heat tempered) glass can resist high blast pressures without damage provided it is well supported in a strong and rigid frame. When it does break its fragments are less injurious than plain glass shards, but when used on its own toughened glass should have anti-shatter film applied.



Blast Resistant Glass: Laminated Glass

14 The minimum overall thickness of laminated glass to use is usually 7.5mm, including a minimum polyvinylbutryal (pvb) interlayer thickness of 1.5mm. It should be fixed in a frame designed to withstand a static force of 7kN/sqm over the complete area of the glazing and frame. Panes with an edge dimension of 1m or more should be provided with a frame rebate of at least 35mm giving a minimum bearing of 30mm.

15 If robust frames and deep rebates cannot be provided, a level of protection equivalent to anti-shatter film on plain glass with net curtains can be achieved using thinner laminated glass, eg 6.8mm thick.

16 In double glazing, the preferred standard is a 7.5mm laminated glass inner pane with a 6mm toughened glass outer pane in a robust frame with deep rebates. In less robust frames the laminated inner pane can be reduced to 6.8mm thick, but 7.5mm thick glass is still preferred.

NOTES

NOTES

NOTES

